More thoughts on Iran
The war against Iran thankfully ended up being a dog that didn’t bark. Israel never had the power to mount an invasion and occupation. And Trump ruled this out at the outset. This meant that from day 1 all the goals had to be limited by whatever bombing alone could accomplish.
This turned out to be not much. If preliminary intelligence reports can be believed—and they are much more reliable than Trump—Iran’s program was set back by mere months. One could be forgiven for asking what all this sound and fury was about. There is a huge gap between rhetoric and tangible change.
The Israeli position was that given Iran’s high level of uranium enrichment, it had become intolerably close to producing a bomb, and that such a development would be an existential threat to Israel. Well, they are still in possession of the same amount of nuclear material. Their facilities have merely sustained some damage that is expected to be repaired within months. Logic dictates that Israel should attack them again at the earliest opportunity and however often it takes to set back their nuclear program. To do anything else would be a tacit admission that this recent bombing campaign had not been in response to an existential threat after all.
I am generally in favor of following norms, especially when it comes to norms one enforces on the rest of the world. If such norms must be broken, then the benefits ought to clearly outweigh the loss of face and credibility. I don’t think that standard was met here. We and our ally have once again proclaimed to the world that the vaunted “rules-based international order” does not apply to us. Rules for thee, exceptions for me. And what was gained in exchange? Netanyahu got to sell himself as a strong, decisive leader to his people. And eyes were turned away from Gaza for about a week. Trump got to show that he possesses strong weapons and is willing to order the bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities. But the strategic situation has not changed: Iran still possesses the institutional knowledge to make progress on building a bomb. Even if the preliminary report is underestimating the damage done to Iran, it does not change the fact that they can immediately start rebuilding their facilities.
There is no easy solution, here. Our options to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb remain what they have always been: diplomacy on one hand and war on the other. We had a diplomatic solution in place that many people who preferred war understandably hated. But it would take more than a bombing campaign to destroy Iranian nuclear capabilities and ambitions. It would take an actual invasion and regime change. But there is scant support for such a policy in the US. What, then?
Let’s now look at the world from Iran’s perspective.
They have two powerful enemies in the form of the US and Israel, both nuclear-armed.
They have a regional rival for influence in the Middle East, in the form of the Saudi Arabia-UAE axis.
Their strategic position has significantly worsened in the past few years.
Israel has severely degraded the fighting capabilities of Hezbollah.
Israel has destroyed Hamas as a fighting force.
The Assad regime has lost power in Syria, and the new government has allowed Israel to use Syrian airspace to counter Iranian missiles.
The Houthis in Yemen and some militias in Iraq remain the only major outpost of Iranian influence outside its borders. These have limited capacity to inflict meaningful harm to the US and Israel.
The sanctions re-imposed by the Trump administration during its first term and allowed to remain in place by the Biden administration have had a negative impact on the Iranian economy.
A hot war with Israel, especially one joined by the US, was unwinnable by Iran at this time. And the leadership furthermore incurred the risk of being toppled. It was in their interest to de-escalate the situation as quickly as possible and live to fight another day.
The biggest priority for the Iranian leadership is to get those sanctions lifted. This would grow the economy, reduce social tension/political discontent, allow the strengthening of the military and the rearming of its proxies, and permit Iran to continue countering the ambitions of the Saudis/Emiratis in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Bahrain.
The only bargaining chip Iran has in order to get the economic sanctions lifted is the threat of nuclear armament. In chess, you learn early on that a potential threat is often more powerful than an actualized one, because your opponent has to spend energy and tie up resources to guard against the activation of the threat. Ideally for Iran, it would have both nuclear weapons and lifted sanctions. But going for nukes is always risky. They have been thoroughly penetrated by Israeli and Western intelligence, and they know that any decision to actually pursue nukes would be leaked to the West. So the calculus up to now was to use the threat that they might at some point go for nukes to prod the US into making a deal that would freeze their nuclear program in exchange for lifted sanctions.
The above goal would be achieve by slowly increasing the amount of enriched uranium and getting close to but not crossing the threshold needed to build a bomb. The US would then have to continuously weigh the risks and benefits for a new deal vs those of a new war. This is an admittedly dangerous gambit. A deal that lifted sanctions would give Iran what it wanted now and hopefully (from its perspective) still preserve the option of nuclear weapons 10, 20, or even 30 years later. The lack of a deal would allow Iran to become a threshold nuclear state, shortening the time it would take to build an actual bomb, and thereby raising the stakes for the US, Israel, and the Gulf states.
It’s too early to tell for sure but the bombing campaign on Iranian territory may have altered the calculus. It would be surprising if they were not more determined now to acquire nuclear weapons and thereby make themselves as invulnerable to invasion as North Korea. It bears highlighting that the advantage to Iran of nuclear weapons would not be offensive weaponry to launch at Israel. We are all the center of our own universe, so we imagine that we occupy the same importance for our adversaries. The Iranian leadership is clearly interested in self-preservation (they consistently take the first opportunity to de-escalate when faced with US aggression. When they feel the need to respond to an attack, they telegraph ahead of time what they’re going to strike and pick targets of secondary importance. They have shown no appetite for suicidal war on their own territory). They understand that a nuclear first strike on Israel would lead to the obliteration of their country. What they seek is to make themselves uninvadable, not to be annihilated.
Overall, I think US policy-makers need to first answer how willing they are to invade and occupy Iran. If this option is not truly on the table, then diplomacy is the only answer. This would be a tacit admission that pulling away from the Iran nuclear deal was a mistake. If invasion is truly an option, then they should start truly preparing for it and making that case to the US public. Because one thing that is clear is that Iranian enrichment will not stop. It is the only card they have left to play.
A sound analysis, except even making a nuclear weapon may not help Iran. Iran would need both atomic weapons and a means of delivering them effectively. That last is a bit more difficult, as it would require sufficient nuclear armed missiles to overcome both Israeli and US attacks on launch sites (i.e. the threat starting a launch wouldn't result in obliteration.)
Israel can probably be deterred, but maybe not: the use of the Hannibal Doctrine, killing their own soldiers and civilians during the 10/07 attacks indicates the nation might be willing to chance a direct hit, even if failure to stop an Iranian missile resulted in massive casualties. And make no mistake, such an attack would result in the utter obliteration of much of Iran and its people, as Israel possesses numerous nuclear weapons and has no moral compunctions regarding civilian deaths. Iran might be able to damage Israel, if Israeli counter measures against a weapon prove ineffective, but no one inside or outside Iran doubts Israel's ability and willingness to counter punch with far more devastation. So even acquiring a nuke might not change the balance of power between the two nations, given Israel has many more nukes ready to go.
Iran can't reach the US directly and at this point it's likely the US might choose to employ nuclear weapons as a first strike should the Iranian regime declare itself a nuclear armed power. That too is an existential risk for both the regime and its citizens, who might well be willing to mount their own rebellion if their only other choice is death from above by Israeli and US nukes.
At best Iran rolls the dice and goes for nuclear weapons, and hopes this doesn't immediately trigger an all out war with Israel and the US. At worst they end up committing suicide, just like the actual Carthaginian general Hannibal. It's a true dilemma, where either choice results in getting gored and bleeding out.
What I found more intriguing were the non-responses from China and Russia. Russia, it's true, is tied up with its own elective war in Ukraine, but the lack of risk taking by China and Trump's willingness to act may deter their own plans to take Taiwan by force. China may not be as bellicose as portrayed by its wolf warrior diplomats.
Or it could simply come down to Iran's messianic government isn't worth the risk in its allies' eyes, and Russia will still continue to attempt to take more of Ukraine while the Chinese bide their time, hiding their strength until they believe the moment to take Taiwan is right.
We might be reading too much into the conflict. Iran could well be, as you observe, the dog that doesn't bark, knowing it can't follow up with a convincing bite. If so, even nukes may not provide a sharp enough deterrent against further aggression from Israel or the USA.
One achievement Bibi and Trump have gained is the ideals of a moral or limited war are no longer in vogue and brutal realpolitik back. It seems madness now that we were willing to invade Iraq and kill hundreds of thousands of people, but no steal the oil. The idea of not directly attacking civilians also no longer merits serious consideration, as both Ukraine and Gaza clearly demonstrate. We're firmly in the territory of the strong do as they wish and the weak suffer what they must at this point, no moral pretenses necessary. In that sense the Iran bombing is but to be expected.
Dear Habib, I followed you from Quora to Substack. Your perspectives are usually deep and very revealing. You said in 6 (g): "They have shown no appetite for suicidal war on their own territory). They understand that a nuclear first strike on Israel would lead to the obliteration of their country. What they seek is to make themselves uninvadable, not to be annihilated."...I hope that some policy maker sees this and it actually gets to influence some major decision...Sadly, except for maybe China, people like you never get to make or advice on major policy decisions around the world again.